The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack

Last month’s lone gunman DDoS attack against Georgia President’s web site seemed like a signal shot for the cyber siege to come a week later. Here’s the complete coverage of the coordination phrase, the execution and the actual impact of the cyber attack so far – “Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress” :

Who’s behind it? The infamous Russian Business Network, or literally every Russian supporting Russia’s actions? How coordinated and planned the cyber attack is, and do we actually have a relatively decent example of cyber warfare combining PSYOPs (psychological operations), and self-mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading “For our motherland, brothers!” or “Your country is calling you!” hacktivist messages across web forums. Let’s find out, in-depth. With the attacks originally starting to take place several weeks before the actual “intervention” with Georgia President’s web site coming under DDoS attack from Russian hackers in July, followed by active discussions across the Russian web on whether or not DDoS attacks and web site defacements should in fact be taking place, which would inevitably come as a handy tool to be used against Russian from Western or Pro-Western journalists, the peak of DDoS attack and the actual defacements started taking place as of Friday.”

Some of the tactics used :
distributing a static list of targets, eliminate centralized coordination of the attack, engaging the average internet users, empower them with DoS tools; distributing lists of remotely SQL injectable Georgian sites; abusing public lists of email addresses of Georgian politicians for spamming and targeted attacks; destroy the adversary’s ability to communicate using the usual channels — Georgia’s most popular hacking portal is under DDoS attack from Russian hackers.

Some of the parked domains acting as command and control servers for one of the botnets at :
emultrix .org
yandexshit .com
ad.yandexshit .com
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com
killgay .com
ns1.guagaga .net
ns2.guagaga .net
ohueli .net
pizdos .net

Actual command and control locations :
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com/a/nahui/vse/zaebalo/v/pizdu/
prosto.pizdos .net/_lol/

Consider going through the complete coverage of what’s been happening during the weeked. Considering the combination of tactics used, unless the conflict gets solved, more attacks will definitely take place during the week.

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